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1. Envelope Theorem

Let $F(a) = \max_x f(x, a)$ s.t. $g(x, a) \geq 0, x \geq 0$, Assume, the solution is differentiable.

$$\mathcal{L}(x, \lambda, a) = f(x, a) + \lambda g(x, a) \quad \text{Then } \frac{\partial F(a)}{\partial a_j} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial a_j} \Big|_{x(a), \lambda(a)}$$

Sketch of proof: $\frac{\partial F(a)}{\partial a_j} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x} \frac{\partial x}{\partial a_j} + \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda} \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial a_j} + \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial a_j} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial a_j} + 0 + 0 = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial a_j}$
 $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_i} = 0$ or $x_i = 0$ and therefore $\frac{\partial x_i}{\partial a_j} = 0$. Same for λ instead of x .

2. Two problems.

Primal problem	Dual problem
$\max_x \{u(x) p \cdot x \leq I\}$	$\min_x \{p \cdot x u(x) \geq U\}$
$u(x)$ - direct utility	$I = p \cdot x$ - income
$x(p, I)$ - marshallian demand	$x^c(p, U)$ - (hicksian) compensated demand
$v(p, I) = u(x(p, I))$ - indirect utility	$M(p, U) = p \cdot x^c(p, U)$ - expenditure
• continuous	• continuous
• homogeneous degree zero in (p, I)	• homogeneous of degree one in p
• strictly increasing in I	• strictly increasing in U
• decreasing in p	• increasing in p
• quasiconvex in (p, I)	• concave in p
Roy's identity: $x_i(p, I) = -\frac{\partial v(p, I) / \partial p_i}{\partial v(p, I) / \partial I}$	Sheppard's lemma: $\partial M(p, U) / \partial p_i = x_i^c(p, U)$

a) Roy's identity: Imagine $\mathcal{L}(x, \lambda, p, I) = u(x) + \lambda(I - px)$ $v(p, I) = u(x(p, I))$
 ENV: $\frac{\partial v(p, I)}{\partial I} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial I} = \lambda$ $\frac{\partial v(p, I)}{\partial p_i} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial p_i} = -\lambda x_i$ Therefore, $x_i = -\frac{\partial v(p, I) / \partial p_i}{\partial v(p, I) / \partial I}$.

b) Sheppard's lemma: $\mathcal{L}(x, \lambda, p, U) = px + \lambda(u(x) - U)$ $M(p, U) = p \cdot x^c(p, U)$
 ENV: $\frac{\partial M(p, U)}{\partial p_i} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial p_i} = x_i^c(p, U)$

c) $M(p, U)$ concave: $M(tp^1 + (1-t)p^2, U) = \min_x \{(tp^1 + (1-t)p^2) \cdot x | u(x) \geq U\} \geq$
 $\geq \min_x \{(1-t)p^2 \cdot x | u(x) \geq U\} + \min_x \{tp^1 \cdot x | u(x) \geq U\} = tM(p^1, U) + (1-t)M(p^2, U)$

3. Equivalence Relationships:

$$M(p, v(p, I)) = I \quad v(p, M(p, U)) = U$$

$$x_i(p, I) = x_i^c(p, v(p, I)) \quad x_i^c(p, U) = x_i(p, M(p, U))$$

Differentiating the last and using Sheppard's lemma:
 $\frac{\partial x_i^c(p, U)}{\partial p_j} = \frac{\partial x_i(p, I)}{\partial p_j} + \frac{\partial M(p, U)}{\partial p_j} \frac{\partial x_i(p, I)}{\partial I} = \frac{\partial x_i(p, I)}{\partial p_j} + x_j \frac{\partial x_i(p, I)}{\partial I}$. Therefore:

Slutsky equation: $\frac{\partial x_i(p, I)}{\partial p_j} = \frac{\partial x_i^c(p, U)}{\partial p_j} \Big|_U - x_j(p, I) \frac{\partial x_i(p, I)}{\partial I} = SE + IE$

4. Example: Midterm 1998, Question 1

Let $u(x) = x_1^\alpha x_2^\beta$, $p = (p_1, p_2)$, $w = (w_1, w_2)$.

a) Find demands

Cobb-Douglas: $p_i x_i = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\beta} (p_1 w_1 + p_2 w_2)$

Therefore, $x_1(p, I) = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\beta} \frac{p_1 w_1 + p_2 w_2}{p_1}$ $x_2(p, I) = \frac{\beta}{\alpha+\beta} \frac{p_1 w_1 + p_2 w_2}{p_2}$

b) Derive the expenditure function

$$v(p, I) = \left(\frac{\alpha}{p_1}\right)^\alpha \left(\frac{\beta}{p_2}\right)^\beta \left(\frac{p_1 w_1 + p_2 w_2}{\alpha+\beta}\right)^{\alpha+\beta} = U$$

Therefore, $M(p, U) = (\alpha + \beta) \left(\frac{p_1}{\alpha}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\beta}} \left(\frac{p_2}{\beta}\right)^{\frac{\beta}{\alpha+\beta}} U^{\frac{1}{\alpha+\beta}}$

$$x_1^c(p_1, p_2, U) = \frac{1}{\alpha+\beta} \frac{\alpha}{p_1} (\alpha + \beta) \left(\frac{p_1}{\alpha}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\beta}} \left(\frac{p_2}{\beta}\right)^{\frac{\beta}{\alpha+\beta}} U^{\frac{1}{\alpha+\beta}} = \left(\frac{\alpha}{p_1} \frac{p_2}{\beta}\right)^{\frac{\beta}{\alpha+\beta}} U^{\frac{1}{\alpha+\beta}}$$

$$x_2^c(I, p_1, p_2) = \frac{\beta}{\alpha+\beta} \frac{p_1 w_1 + p_2 w_2}{p_2} = \left(\frac{p_1}{\alpha} \frac{\beta}{p_2}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\beta}} U^{\frac{1}{\alpha+\beta}}$$

c) Prove that $x_1 = w_1 - p_1 \frac{\partial v(p, I) / \partial p_1}{\partial v(p, I) / \partial w_1}$

$\mathcal{L}(p, w) = u(x) + \lambda(p_1 w_1 + p_2 w_2 - p_1 x_1 - p_2 x_2)$

Using Roy's identity: $-\frac{\partial v(p, I) / \partial p_1}{\partial v(p, I) / \partial w_1} = -\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}(p, I) / \partial p_1}{\partial \mathcal{L}(p, I) / \partial w_1} = -\frac{\lambda(w_1 - x_1)}{\lambda p_1} = \frac{x_1 - w_1}{p_1}$

Therefore, $x_1 = w_1 - p_1 \frac{\partial v(p, I) / \partial p_1}{\partial v(p, I) / \partial w_1}$.

d) When is the indirect utility convex in endowments?

$$v(p, k \cdot w) = \left(\frac{\alpha}{p_1}\right)^\alpha \left(\frac{\beta}{p_2}\right)^\beta \left(\frac{p_1 k w_1 + p_2 k w_2}{\alpha+\beta}\right)^{\alpha+\beta} = v(p, w) k^{\alpha+\beta}$$

$$\frac{\partial^2}{\partial k^2} k^{\alpha+\beta} = k^{\alpha+\beta-2} (\alpha + \beta) (\alpha + \beta - 1)$$

So, if $\alpha + \beta \geq 1$, $v(p, w)$ is convex in w .

5. Elasticities:

$$E[x, I] = \frac{I}{x} \frac{\partial x}{\partial I} \quad \text{income share: } k_i = \frac{p_i x_i}{I}$$

Engel aggregation (Lemma, 4-2 page 4): $\sum_{i=1}^n k_i E[x_i, I] = 1$

"weighted income elasticities of demand sum up to 1"

Proof: Use $I = px(p, I)$

$$1 = \frac{\partial I}{\partial I} = \frac{\partial (px(p, I))}{\partial I} = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{p_i \partial x_i}{\partial I} = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{p_i x_i}{I} \frac{I}{x_i} \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial I} = \sum_{i=1}^n k_i E[x_i, I]$$

$E[x_i, p_j]$ - cross-price elasticities, $E[x_i, p_i]$ - own-price elasticity

Slutsky equation: $E[x_i, p_i] = E[x_i^c, p_i] - k_i E[x_i, I]$

$$\text{Proof: } \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial p_j} = \frac{\partial x_i^c}{\partial p_j} - x_j \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial I} \quad \frac{p_j}{x_i} \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial p_j} = \frac{p_j}{x_i} \frac{\partial x_i^c}{\partial p_j} - \frac{I}{x_i} \frac{p_j}{x_j} \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial I}$$

$$\frac{p_j}{x_i} \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial p_j} = \frac{p_j}{x_i} \frac{\partial x_i^c}{\partial p_j} - \frac{p_j x_j}{I} \frac{I}{x_i} \frac{\partial x_i}{\partial I} \quad E[x_i, p_j] = E[x_i^c, p_j] - k_j E[x_i, I]$$

Cournot aggregation (Lemma, 4-2 page 10): $\sum_{i=1}^n k_i E[x_i, p_j] + k_j = 0$ for all j .

For the compensated demand it follows that $\sum_{i=1}^n k_i E[x_i^c, p_j] = 0$

"weighted price elasticities of compensated demand sum up to zero"

Proof: Use $I = px(p, I)$

$$0 = \frac{\partial I}{\partial p_j} = \frac{\partial (px(p, I))}{\partial p_j} = x_j + \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \frac{\partial x_i(p, I)}{\partial p_j}$$

$$0 = \frac{p_j x_j}{I} + \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \frac{\partial x_i(p, I)}{\partial p_j} \frac{x_i}{x_i} \frac{p_j}{I} = k_j + \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{p_i x_i}{I} \frac{\partial x_i(p, I)}{\partial p_j} \frac{p_j}{x_i}$$

Use Slutsky and Engel aggregation:

$$0 = \sum_{i=1}^n k_i E[x_i, p_j] + k_j = k_j + \sum_{i=1}^n k_i (E[x_i^c, p_j] - k_j E[x_i, I]) =$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n k_i (E[x_i^c, p_j]) + k_j - \sum_{i=1}^n k_i k_j E[x_i, I] = \sum_{i=1}^n k_i (E[x_i^c, p_j])$$

Elasticity of substitution (2 goods): $E\left[\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1\right] = p_1 \frac{x_1^c}{x_2^c} \frac{\partial}{\partial p_1} \left(\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}\right)$

$$E\left[\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1\right] = p_1 \frac{\partial}{\partial p_1} \ln \frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c} = p_1 \frac{\partial}{\partial p_1} (\ln x_2^c - \ln x_1^c) = E[x_2^c, p_1] - E[x_1^c, p_1]$$

Cournot: $0 = k_1 E[x_1^c, p_1] + k_2 E[x_2^c, p_1] \Rightarrow$

$$0 = k_1 E[x_1^c, p_1] + k_2 \left(E\left[\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1\right] + E[x_1^c, p_1]\right)$$

$$0 = k_1 \left(-E\left[\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1\right] + E[x_2^c, p_1]\right) + k_2 E[x_2^c, p_1]$$

Therefore, $E\left[\frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1\right] = -\frac{E[x_1^c, p_1]}{k_2} = \frac{E[x_2^c, p_1]}{k_1} = -E\left[\frac{x_1^c}{x_2^c}, p_1\right] = \sigma$

Using this, one can show, that $E[x_1^c, p_1] = -k_2 \sigma$ $E[x_2^c, p_1] = k_1 \sigma$.

Using Slutsky, $E[x_1, p_1] = -(1 - k_1) \sigma - k_1 E[x_i, I]$ - decomposition of own price elasticity.

6. Example: CES.

$$\text{CES: } U(c) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^n c_i^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}, \sigma > 0, \sigma \neq 1$$

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial c_i} U(c) = \frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left(\sum_{i=1}^n c_i^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}-1} (1-\frac{1}{\sigma}) c_i^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \left(\sum_{i=1}^n c_i^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}} c_i^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \left(\frac{U(c)}{c_i}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}$$

FOC: $\frac{\partial}{\partial c_i} U(c) = \lambda p_i \Rightarrow \frac{\frac{\partial}{\partial c_i} U(c)}{p_i} = \frac{\frac{\partial}{\partial c_j} U(c)}{p_j} \Leftrightarrow$

$$\frac{\left(\frac{U(c)}{c_i}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{p_i} = \frac{\left(\frac{U(c)}{c_j}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{p_j} \Leftrightarrow p_i c_i^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} = p_j c_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \Leftrightarrow \left(\frac{p_i}{p_j}\right)^{\sigma} = \frac{c_j}{c_i}$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n p_j c_j = \sum_{j=1}^n p_j c_i \left(\frac{p_i}{p_j}\right)^{\sigma} = c_i \sum_{j=1}^n (p_j)^{1-\sigma} (p_i)^{\sigma} = I \Rightarrow c_i(p, I) = \frac{I}{(p_i)^{\sigma} \sum_{j=1}^n (p_j)^{1-\sigma}}$$

$$U(c(p, I)) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^n c_i^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}(p, I)\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}} = I \left(\sum_{i=1}^n \left((p_i)^{\sigma} \sum_{j=1}^n (p_j)^{1-\sigma}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}-1}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}}$$

$$= I \left(\sum_{j=1}^n (p_j)^{1-\sigma}\right)^{-1} \left(\sum_{i=1}^n (p_i)^{1-\sigma}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}}} \quad v(p, I) = I \left(\sum_{i=1}^n (p_i)^{1-\sigma}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

$$M(p, U) = \frac{U}{\left(\sum_{i=1}^n (p_i)^{1-\sigma}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}} \quad c_i^c(p, I) = \frac{U}{(p_i)^{\sigma} \left(\sum_{i=1}^n (p_i)^{1-\sigma}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}} \quad \frac{c_j}{c_i} = \frac{c_j^c}{c_i^c} = \left(\frac{p_i}{p_j}\right)^{\sigma}$$

$$E\left[\frac{c_j^c}{c_i^c}, p_i\right] = p_i \frac{\partial}{\partial p_i} \ln \frac{c_j^c}{c_i^c} = p_i \frac{\partial}{\partial p_i} \ln \left(\frac{p_i}{p_j}\right)^{\sigma} = p_i \frac{\partial}{\partial p_i} \sigma (\ln p_i - \ln p_j) = \sigma$$

CES utility - constant elasticity of substitution.